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ABSTRACT
Numerous universities throughout the world have established top- 
level advisory boards – informal bodies and councils that the insti-
tutional leadership may consult on issues perceived as important. 
Through a series of qualitative interviews with members of such 
entities as well as representatives of the institutions appointing 
them, the article sheds light on how strategic advisory bodies 
function, and how these entities frame and interact with the institu-
tional leadership. We observe that strategic advisory boards repre-
sent a hybrid form of governance installing mutual dependencies 
between representatives of the boards and the institutional leader-
ship – what we label as a kind of controlled collegiality. While 
university leadership acts as a gatekeeper controlling access to 
these boards, once members are nominated the power relations 
between the actors, become more equal. The study highlights the 
importance of strategic advisory boards as new elements in higher 
education governance – working in the shadow of more formal 
governance arrangements. Here, we argue that the establishment 
of these boards can be interpreted as a re-introduction of a collegial 
element in universities exposed to a number of reforms resulting in 
more streamlined and managerial governance structures.
Introduction
Establishing advisory boards has become a trend among universities in a range of 
countries. Members of such boards are often characterized by their broad international 
leadership experience, an international research profile, and/or societal influence, and 
their mandate is normally to advise the institution on issues perceived of strategic 
importance – although such councils and boards rarely are part of the formal governance 
structure of the university in question (Altbach et al., 2016). Altbach et al. (2016) have 
argued that the establishment of such boards can be seen as a way to internationalize the 
governance of universities – labeling them international advisory councils due to their 
predominantly international membership and focus – although they acknowledge that 
such boards may also have other functions.
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The current paper explores this issue further, and argues that the establishment of 
advisory boards can also be related to other strategic matters, not least as a response to 
the many reforms universities have been exposed to domestically, and how they – as 
a consequence – have become more rationalized as organizations and influenced by 
management (Krücken & Meier, 2006; Ramirez, 2006). In the remainder of this paper, 
advisory boards will thus be labeled as `strategic advisory boards` – hinting to their 
possible diverse intended functions at their host institutions. However, while the emer-
gence of advisory boards can certainly be seen as yet another example of this managerial 
turn, it can also be argued that such boards are a way for universities to reinvent more 
traditional modes of governance which have been eliminated in the recent reforms and 
streamlining of university steering. An important point in this respect is also the reduc-
tion of the number of collegial bodies in university governance as a result of various 
reform processes, and how this has affected the traditional modes of shared governance 
in higher education (Capano, 2011; Dill, 2012; Seeber et al., 2015; Stensaker & Vabø, 
2013; Teelken, 2015). As such, it can be observed that while many universities have 
eliminated one set of internal consultative bodies, they are at the same time building up 
a new set of external bodies – also having consultative functions.
The current paper explores how and in what way strategic advisory boards affect 
university governance, and the issues and perspectives these bodies bring to university 
governance. Based on the concept of shadow organizing – informal organizing that is not 
part of formal governance arrangements (Gherardi et al., 2017) – theoretical assumptions 
related to the possible roles and functions of strategic advisory boards are developed, and 
used as point of departure for empirical exploration.
The study is a qualitative exploratory study based on interviews with institutional 
representatives and members of more than 25 strategic advisory bodies in universities 
located in 20 different countries throughout the world – although with an overrepre-
sentation of Western European countries.
In the following section, we will introduce the theoretical framework of the study 
based on recent governance reforms and the concept of shadow organizations. This is 
followed by an overview of the data and methods used and the presentation of the results 
of the study. In the final section, we discuss our findings in the light of higher education 
governance and organizational studies literature.
Changes in university governance – a theoretical framework
Trends in university governance
During the last two decades a number of studies have observed strengthened hierarchical 
governance within universities, including more centralized decision-making, and the 
appearance of a more formalized and rationalized organization (Bleiklie et al., 2015; 
Capano, 2011; Christensen, 2011; Krücken & Meier, 2006; Maassen et al., 2017; Ramirez, 
2006). While this trend is perhaps most visible in Europe, there are also a number of 
studies from other regions of the world hinting that universities are becoming more 
managerial and governed (Christensen et al., 2019; Fumasoli & Stensaker, 2013).
As part of this trend, it is also possible to observe strengthened executive boards 
and a much more prominent role of the institutional leadership in many universities 
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(De Boer et al., 2007; Maassen & Stensaker, 2011; Ramirez & Christensen, 2013). 
University boards are – in many countries – containing a higher share of stakeholders 
and representatives of industry and private interests, and the role of the rector or 
president is becoming more professionalized in the sense that it has become a career 
path for an increasing number of people (Frølich et al., 2018; Teelken, 2015). A similar 
professionalization can also be observed within the university administration, where 
dramatic changes can be identified in the educational background of the administration, 
in the tasks they perform and in new functions emerging in the university (Christensen 
et al., 2019; Enders et al., 2013; Gornitzka et al., 2017; Ramirez & Christensen, 2013). In 
addition, universities are increasingly using professional consultants from outside, which 
may further drive the transformation of the university into a `normal` organization 
(Seidenschnur & Krücken, 2019).
The development has raised concerns that the collegial influence in university deci-
sion-making may be reduced as a consequence (Dill, 2012; Sahlin, 2012). Elimination of 
collegial councils and bodies or the reduction of their influence in decision-making are 
typical examples mentioned in this respect (Stensaker & Vabø, 2013).
However, a more recent trend is also the establishment of new high-profile strategic 
advisory boards at institutional level in a number of universities in Europe and Asia 
(Altbach et al., 2016). These boards are normally established outside – or in parallel to – 
the formal governance arrangements and closely linked to the institutional leadership. 
According to Altbach et al. (2016, p. 13) these boards and councils may be categorized as 
both symbolic and transformative, but regardless of categorization, they tend to be 
populated by distinguished academics and/or former leaders of prestigious universities – 
often from abroad. Although their functions may vary, Altbach et al. (2016, p. 14) suggest 
that an important role of these boards is to support strategic internationalization 
attempts, and that they could be interpreted as an example of how internationalization 
even shapes institutional governance. Such an interpretation may echo developments in 
many other organizational sectors globally (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000; Djelic 
& Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Djelic & Quack, 2018).
Emerging shadow structures
However, the emergence of strategic advisory boards may be related to other drivers than 
internationalization and globalization. It is, as such, possible to argue that the establish-
ment of strategic advisory boards is a reaction to the elimination of other collegial bodies 
and councils in the university, a way to reintroduce a collegial element in a more 
rationalized and formalized organization, and to access knowledge and seek advice 
after the dissolution of collegial bodies. As such, strategic advisory boards share an 
important characteristic with traditional collegial bodies and councils: they may add 
legitimacy to decisions or decision-making processes.
Of course, strategic advisory boards also differ from collegial bodies in a number of 
ways as their members have employment in other – often foreign – universities, and that 
their members are academics often having broad leadership experience, for example, as 
rectors or presidents, or leaders of distinguished research centers (Altbach et al., 2016). It 
should therefore be underlined that strategic advisory boards are not typical collegial 
structures.
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How then can strategic advisory boards be conceptualized? We propose that they can 
be seen as a form of shadow governance in universities. This concept is based on the 
recent theorization of shadow organizing as a useful metaphor in organizational studies 
(Gherardi et al., 2017), as a way to handle knowledge overflow (Jensen, 2018), or facilitate 
stakeholder collaboration in higher education (Jensen et al., 2020). These studies are 
inspired by observations on how shadow education is often found in educational systems 
(Nordhaug, 1991) describing informal teaching and learning activities which are taking 
place in the shadow of formal education. The shadow metaphor can be interpreted in 
several ways (Gherardi et al., 2017) – both as an activity that is imitating formal 
structures, providing an important supplement to what is formally recognized, and as 
an activity lacking legitimacy and recognition – which consequently has to be performed 
outside the spotlight. Regardless, the outcome may be increased organizational complex-
ity (Kraatz & Block, 2008).
The metaphor of the shadow may also be conceptualized in relation to more tradi-
tional forms of governance in higher education. While collegial forms of governance 
often are associated with an understanding that academic staff in general is involved in 
decision-making in a shared way with other stakeholders (Chapman, 1983; Clark, 1983; 
Dill, 2012; Stensaker & Vabø, 2013), historical examples can also be found of how 
individual powerful academics used their position to influence decisions in the univer-
sity – in ways that were not always to the liking of their colleagues (De Boer & Stensaker, 
2007). In relation to the latter, recent research has also suggested that influential 
academics – controlling prestigious funding or having a high status – still have consider-
able impact on decision-making in the modern university (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2017).
Shadow governance can, thus, be understood in two different ways: either as a return 
of the elite academic in the governing of the modern university, or as a return to more 
universal collegial forms of governance in a university which has become too managerial. 
While the two forms of shadow governance share some characteristics, they are also 
distinct in several dimensions. Traditional collegial governance forms tend to be char-
acterized by the election of representatives, having relatively open agendas as to what 
issues these governance bodies may discuss, by a high degree of consensus in decision- 
making and by adding legitimacy to the governing process (De Boer & Stensaker, 2007). 
Historically, elite academic governance arrangements have been described differently, as 
rather targeted and politicized arenas where inclusion in these processes is a matter of 
selection (Lobkowicz, 1983). Daalder and Shils (1982) have also underlined that histori-
cally elite academic governance arrangements were processes more characterized by 
conflict than consensus, focusing more on the struggle for specific resources than 
legitimacy in general. Table 1 summarizes the main differences between the two 
perspectives.






Purpose Distribution of resources Legitimacy
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The two perspectives should not be interpreted as necessarily mutually exclusive, and 
they may both be interpreted as typical examples of increased organizational complexity 
in knowledge organizations (Kraatz & Block, 2008). Following from this it may also be 
argued that strategic advisory bodies may be tools to tackle uncertainty concerning future 
strategic directions and priorities (Fumasoli et al., 2015), as a means to manage academic 
culture (Dill, 2012), or as a translation of how older forms of governance can fit in with 
expectations of how modern management should look like (Sahlin, 2012).
Methodology
The data the current article builds upon was originally collected and analyzed for a study 
on how internationalization of higher education impacts the field of governance (Altbach 
et al., 2016), especially focusing on how international advisory councils have developed 
and function at universities in different countries. The study was conducted using 
grounded theory. Of the interviews undertaken, the main bulk of informants were 
members of various international advisory councils and boards (77%), although a small 
number of those interviewed were also institutional representatives responsible for 
appointing and organizing such entities (23%). For the current study, additional inter-
views with institutional representatives, including members of university leaderships and 
former university presidents/rectors, were undertaken to get a richer and more elaborate 
picture of the institutional motives for setting up strategic advisory boards.
Instrument design
The semi-structured interview protocols used as part of this research were initially 
designed in close consultation with two members of strategic advisory bodies (the inter-
view protocols employed are included in Altbach et al., 2016, pp. 21–22). However, 
consistent with a grounded theory instrument design and data collection approach 
(Wimpenny & Gass, 2000) the interview protocols were refined as new themes emerged 
as part of previous interviews – in line with the exploratory ambition of the current 
article.
Data collection
Members of strategic advisory boards and representatives of institutions hosting them 
were initially identified from the information available online on the webpages of several 
universities that host such bodies. The set of strategic advisory boards identified initially 
was located in distinct countries and world regions. Individuals who were members of 
multiple strategic boards were first invited to participate in an interview. Additional 
participants were recruited through what is known as a snowball data collection method 
(Atkinson & Flint, 2001) – where existing informants are used to identify other infor-
mants. As the first two methods for participant recruitment resulted in an over- 
representation of male respondents from Western contexts, an additional search of female 
members of strategic boards as well as board members who originated from non-Western 
contexts was conducted. Recruitment of participants continued until data saturation was 
reached through interviews. About 70% of individuals invited to participate in this study 
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agreed to be interviewed. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in person, via 
e-mail, through skype and other electronic media. In total, 28 interviews have been 
undertaken where the informants cover more than 25 unique boards at universities located 
in Russia, Europe, the Middle East, Asia and South America.
Sample and participants
Recruited informants matched the profile of members listed on available webpages of 
strategic boards, consistent with a purposive sampling approach, often employed in 
grounded theory studies (Morse, 2010). Most of the informants were male (72%), aged 
above 50 (84%), and with a significant over-representation from Western Europe and the 
US (72%). Their profile was a result of the fact that accomplished academics, Nobel Prize 
laureates and former university leaders – often from prestigious universities and retired – 
were recruited to serve on strategic boards. Because the population of strategic boards is 
unknown, it is not possible to assess how representative the sample of interviewees 
included in this study is. However, the sample of interviewees included in this study is 
reflective of documented gender, regional, and reputational disparities in higher educa-
tion (Altbach et al., 2009). In order to preserve the anonymity of respondents, additional 
demographic information cannot be provided.
Data analysis
Semi-structured interviews were transcribed and analyzed using a thematic analysis 
procedure (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In this process, after conducting a grounded theory 
initial coding process, the researchers identified several emerging themes from the data, 
using the framework of shadow governance, and conducted subsequent reviews to ensure 
the themes represent patterns strongly visible in the data.
Researcher positionality
Bjørn Stensaker and Georgiana Mihut were responsible for collecting and analyzing 
interview data. Thus, it is mainly their positionality that is relevant for the analytic 
approach of this study. Bjørn Stensaker is an established professor at a research- 
intensive European university, who has significant international experience both regard-
ing research but also being involved in evaluations, boards, etc. This was helpful in 
gaining access to respondents. Georgiana Mihut was a PhD student at the time of data 
collection and thus somewhat of an outsider to both elite and collegial university 
governance processes. However, due to the affiliation of the study by Altbach et al. 
(2016) with the World Bank and the Boston College Center for International Higher 
Education, the study was able to attract a wide range of qualified participants who shared 
their experiences openly.
Credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability
Credibility, dependability, confirmability and transferability are criteria commonly used 
to ensure the trustworthiness of qualitative research (Cope, 2014). In order to ensure 
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credibility, research findings have been shared with study participants in advance of 
publication to ensure that their views and experiences are reflected in the written 
findings. In addition, findings based on this data have been shared at an international 
gathering of university leaders and international experts to gather additional feedback. 
This study includes data collected at two points in time, using different participants. 
Findings from the two cohorts of interviewees were similar, indicating the dependability 
and transferability of the study. This paper uses rich quotes from participants to support 
key findings, thus ensuring the confirmability of the study.
Limitations
Snowball recruitment techniques (Atkinson & Flint, 2001) have both strengths and 
weaknesses. As a strength, informants share similar experiences and the procedure 
represents a triangulation of observations of the same phenomenon. Its weaknesses are 
related to the potential selection skewness of informants. Qualitative approaches cannot 
support generalizable conclusions. As little research has been undertaken on the func-
tioning of strategic advisory boards, qualitative approaches that employ snowball recruit-
ment techniques are appropriate, despite their limitations.
Results
Appointment
For most of the strategic advisory boards examined in the current study, the appointment 
procedure is somewhat diffuse. Most members of the board have little exact knowledge of 
why they were appointed – although they acknowledge that their reputation and experi-
ence are key explanations (see also Altbach et al., 2016).
Although some of the strategic boards also had members with a business and policy 
background, the vast majority of members seem to have an academic background from 
the university sector. As underlined by one of the informants commenting about the 
background of fellow members of the board:
Well, it’s a very mixed background. They were all, without exception they were all aca-
demics, presumably they were all distinguished in their fields.
This emphasis on having people with a strong academic background as members of the 
strategic advisory boards seems to be a deliberate strategy for many institutions. The 
argument is as one representative of a university with an established strategic advisory 
board explains:
Because we wanted to have people that are knowledgeable about higher education, and 
corporate normally know about corporate, and they bring a very valuable perspective, but in 
more detail strategic discussion we found that is often difficult to get a good assessment of 
what universities are all about, how they function, their markets, things like that. What you 
often get from corporate is some employment perceptions, a lot of corporate needs and 
basically the use of analogies between the corporate world and the higher education sector, 
and we did not want that.
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The members of the strategic boards are as a general trend also not elected – they are 
selected by the university leadership, and appointed through a personal invitation, 
often directly coming from the rector/president of the university. When asked about 
how they as individuals have been found suitable for serving on the strategic advisory 
board, many informants acknowledge that their names have been put forward by 
existing members of the boards, or through existing academic networks they are part 
of. Key selection mechanisms for being appointed to a strategic advisory board thus 
include a strong CV, being a reputed academic, or belonging to the right academic 
networks.
For universities in smaller countries, the fact that many of the strategic advisory 
boards have a strong international presence seems to be due to a lack of expertise and 
independence by domestic researchers. As pointed out by an institutional representative 
from a European university:
. . . You do not want (name of citizens from the host country) on the board, you need 
international (presence) when you are in a small country.
To sum up, most of the strategic advisory boards examined in the current study can be 
characterized by their high degree of academic expertise and reputation, their deliberate 
selection, and their international background. The fact that most of the boards examined 
are not paying members any fees or honorarium suggests a strong collegial logic 
embedding these boards (Daalder & Shils, 1982).
Agendas
When asked about what issues are on the agenda of the strategic advisory boards, most 
informants underline the heterogeneity of items discussed. As an informant serving on 
strategic advisory boards of several universities comments about issues on the agenda of 
board meetings:
Well, . . . that was a wide range, but in general, in all cases it was the long term development 
and plans for each of the universities. Universities submitted their plans to the board and the 
board gave advice. In some instances there was advice sought on particular issues and 
projects that were important to the university.
Many informants suggest that they were often included in planning processes, especially 
concerning the development of strategic plans, and that the boards were far from 
discussing only internationalization issues – although having a high international profile. 
Several informants also suggest that the strategic advisory boards quite often raise their 
own agenda and have substantial influence on what issues are on the table. As one 
member of an advisory board in an East-European university points out, the board 
provided:
. . . Some advice that we thought it’s important, not that they necessarily asked us for. And 
we talked among ourselves about how best to operate the committee. Unfortunately the 
committee has a weak chair. And for the purpose of the committee that is something to keep 
in mind, that the Chair of the committee is very important for the success of the committee. 
And the person that runs the committee from the university side is also very important and 
neither of them have been very effective.
8 B. STENSAKER ET AL.
Another member of a strategic advisory board also has rather critical perceptions of the 
ways agendas are identified and carried out in practice:
. . . In my experience, mostly you come to the meetings, you get your reports for the meeting 
before the meeting, you discuss at the meeting, and then you wait until the next round, 
which I found as very ineffective.
The statements above hints to some classical characteristics of collegial processes, where 
poor or absent leadership, loose agendas and poor internal discipline and structure for 
the discussions undertaken are not uncommon (Clark, 1983; De Boer & Stensaker, 2007).
However, in most cases reported upon, the agenda of the strategic advisory boards 
seems to be laid as in an interactive fashion, where there are `negotiations` taking place 
about what issues should be discussed at what length. Several members of the boards 
examined suggest that this loosely organized process is important for the universities as 
well because the discussions:
. . . Serves as an independent piece of evidence. The president will never come in and say 
`I need your help to fight the Ministry`, but when we agree, they can use that. Sometimes 
they can also use that internally in changes.
Hence, as underlined by this experienced board member, the strategic advisory boards 
enjoy some `independence` despite ambitions the institutional leadership may have to 
use the board in a more instrumental fashion. This may be a reason why discussions 
within the boards may be unstructured and somewhat fragmented. The boards seem to 
be given the space to end up with their own conclusions – without these conclusions 
being spelled out in detail beforehand.
Decision-making
The collegial characteristics of the strategic advisory boards tend to characterize also the 
decision-making processes in the boards. The normal approach is that decisions on what 
advice to give are taken in consensus by all members. None of the informants actually 
mentions any conflicts that have arisen inside the boards even if they not always meet for 
a very long time. As one of the informants having several experiences as board member 
recalls:
I do not remember any conflict on either board. Usually there was a consensus reached very 
easily. Even in difficult problems.
Other informants with broad board experience have similar views:
People tend to agree and not really having intensive conflict in discussions in advisory 
boards. That is also because there is no clear decision to be made. It`s the university 
reporting on issues and then ask for opinions, and then you get a free flow of ideas. It`s 
not a very decision making process, it`s more of an exchange of views.
The latter quote may explain why strategic advisory boards may rather easily reach 
agreement – they are not ultimately responsible for the consequences of any decision 
taken, which rests with the formalized governance structure of the universities they are 
serving. At the same time may board consensus also be triggered by the underlying 
values, norms and attitudes held among board members? As one informant suggests:
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I think that (name of board) carries a certain number of values that I feel very committed to 
and so that is also the reason why I want to take part.
It should be underlined, however, that the written statements and summaries after board 
meetings are normally delegated to a secretariat, or to the chairman of the board, and that 
having a limited number of people to formulate any decisions taken or advice given may 
be easier when relatively few are involved.
Purpose
While a number of informants suggest that strategic advisory boards may have been 
established for branding/profiling purposes, not least toward external stakeholders and 
in a more international perspective, the fact that many boards are involved in com-
menting and advising on the development of strategic plans in various universities 
may suggest that their purpose is quite broad – ranging from quality assurance, to 
research priorities, to hiring policies. However, the underlying logic – as suggested by 
one informant is often to add internal legitimacy to whatever issue that is on the 
agenda:
. . . They are also working on the new strategic plan, so our contribution was to give input on 
that. In (name of country) last time (the meeting) was about digitization policy of the 
university, a year before it was about multi-disciplinary research.
It is very rare that boards are created for a single purpose, although an example can be 
identified in our sample of a university establishing a strategic advisory board for 
examining an existing strategic plan and dissolving the board after the job was done. 
However, even in this case the purpose of the board was not related to branding or 
profiling, but to provide internal legitimacy to what the university considered to be an 
important process.
The internal purposes of strategic advisory boards may be different though, in 
different cultural contexts. For example, a number of European universities seem to 
prefer using the boards more instrumentally in their internal governance process as 
clearly indicated by the following quote:
It helps the decision making of the leadership if the leadership can say that the advisory 
board has advised us to do this, that or the other thing, so it is in a sense a legitimating 
operation.
At the same time, might universities in other parts of the world, perhaps with few 
Western European university traditions, want to use strategic advisory boards to intro-
duce a more collegial style of governance – as suggested by another informant having 
experience from strategic advisory boards in various regions in the world:
In both cases (names of boards) is particularly helpful in making individuals understand 
what high quality academic governance is. There are really two key issues: one is the lack of 
academic freedom and the other is no real conception of shared governance.
To sum up, there is a rather unified agreement among the informants that strategic 
advisory boards are important, and that – if they are established – tend to crave 
attention and to be taken seriously. One of the informants – a president of an Asian 
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university – thus argued that this was the main reason why he has not chosen to establish 
a strategic advisory board at his own university:
Several years ago I was talking to my senior management, because I serve on these other 
ones, so we debated this. Frankly, we decided the following. The first reason is this: it takes 
a lot of work. It’s not just that they come once a year for two days: you have to prepare for 
them, you have to organize the travel - that is actually easy - the staff can do that. When you 
ask for their advice, you’d better listen to some of it, otherwise they would not come. It sort 
of ties you, so you have to be ready, to be prepared to receive advice . . ..(otherwise) . . . they 
will say `why waste my time`.
Interestingly, the latter quote also hints toward a reciprocal relationship between the 
strategic advisory boards and the universities that establish them. While the universities 
may create them and organize much of their work, they still have considerable autonomy 
and significance – even with limited formal powers.
Discussion
The aim of the current paper is to explore and provide knowledge as to how we could 
interpret the emergence of strategic advisory bodies in universities in a number of 
countries. While it indeed is possible to label this development as a sort of internationa-
lization of governance (Altbach et al., 2016), the current paper argued that their establish-
ment could also be interpreted as a re-introduction of a collegial element in universities 
exposed to a number of reforms resulting in more streamlined and managerial govern-
ance structures (Ramirez, 2006).
In this, the two sets of ideal expectations that have been developed in the conceptual 
section of this paper were not identified in the empirical material, but instead we 
observed a hybrid of the two. Thus, our findings suggest that current practices are 
a mix between more historical elite academic governance and newer more collegial 
governance structures (Daalder & Shils, 1982; De Boer & Stensaker, 2007) – see Table 2.
Our findings clearly indicate that membership of these boards is not open to everyone, 
and that there is a closely monitored selection process handled by the institutional 
leadership. Key selection criteria seem to be related to managerial experience (academic 
and/or administrative), reputation and international standing. This selection process 
may fit well with the ideas of universities becoming more rationalized and where the 
managerial influence is becoming stronger (Bleiklie et al., 2015; Seeber et al., 2015). In 
this perspective, historical elite governance arrangements are being used as a form of 
coping mechanism by the institutional leadership (cf. Teelken, 2015). In a way, having 
more control over the composition of the strategic advisory boards further strengthens 
Table 2. Central themes emerging from the interviews.
Themes emerging from the interviews
Appointment Pro-active approaches, looking for ‘excellence’, international expertise in high demand
Agendas Open agendas, possibility for individual initiatives, examples of both unstructured discussions 
and focused work
Decision-making Low level of conflict, joint values among members, agreement on the role of the strategic 
advisory board
Purpose Balancing strategic ambitions, trust, and support of academic staff; ‘cultural negotiators’
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the university leadership and thus fits well into a rationalized organization that is 
governed by strong leaders instead of collegial bottom-up processes (Ramirez, 2006). 
Moreover, having control over the selection process allows the leadership of universities 
to compose the advisory board in a way that provides sufficient external prestige due to 
the status of the members, while at the same time preventing a composition that could act 
too much in opposition to the leadership.
However, in a number of other dimensions, more collegial characteristics come to the 
fore (see Table 3); the strategic advisory bodies tend to have quite negotiated agendas 
regarding the issues discussed. While some boards had targeted agendas, informants 
suggested that new issues and items could be introduced as well. Furthermore, strategic 
advisory boards are mainly characterized by consensus in their decision-making, and 
legitimacy seems to be a key purpose. Hence, while the members of the strategic advisory 
boards may indeed be hand-picked by the institutional leadership, these bodies seem to 
enjoy and/or gain some autonomy in their operations – suggesting that they are not 
purely instrumental tools easily manipulated by the institutional leadership (cf. 
Chapman, 1983). This highlights the interdependent relationship between the leadership 
and the strategic advisory boards. As the leadership depends on the legitimacy and 
prestige provided through the members of the board, they cannot totally ignore their 
advice and thus once board members have been selected they can exert a certain amount 
of pressure on the leadership without having formal competences or power. This relation 
is similar to debates about the living autonomy of universities in which the difference 
between formal autonomy from state bodies and day-to-day experienced autonomy is 
highlighted as an important analytical lens to understand the functioning of governance 
arrangements beyond their structural embedding (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2017).
The latter point brings us back to the metaphor of the shadow (Gherardi et al., 2017), 
and how we should understand shadow governance. Apparently, as many universities are 
more than willing and even eager to showcase their strategic advisory boards, their 
existence is far from hidden from the rest of the university or the environment. To the 
contrary, given the legitimacy and prestige that well-staffed advisory boards can provide, 
universities are more likely to openly advocate these structures even though they are not 
part of their formal governance arrangements. Most of our informants also underline 
that their decisions/advices provided to the universities are used extensively for legit-
imizing formal decisions made by the university leadership. Still, while the decisions are 
on public display, the deliberations within strategic boards, similar to the selection 
processes and criteria of its members, seem far less transparent and thus more in the 
shadows. The fact that strategic advisory bodies seem to enjoy certain autonomy also 
suggests that they might have an important function as a provider of important knowl-
edge and advice in a formalized governance structure besides the legitimacy and prestige 
Table 3. The positioning of strategic advisory boards (SABs) related to the theoretical 
expectations.
Elite academic Collegial SABs
Appointment Selected Elected Selected
Agendas Targeted Open Mixed
Decision-making Conflict Consensus Consensus
Purpose Distribution of resources Legitimacy Legitimacy
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that they offer. In a world characterized by uncertainty, having handpicked, experienced 
and expert knowledge to draw upon may provide the institutional leadership with ideas 
of both how and what to prioritize (cf. Fumasoli et al., 2015). Moreover, as strategic 
advisory boards do not have to consider the implementation of their suggestions, they are 
in a position to make bolder propositions to the leadership, which in turn can provide the 
leadership with the legitimacy to embark on more far-reaching reforms. Similar 
dynamics have been observed in studies that investigated how universities use consul-
tants, which highlighted the role of these actors in providing legitimacy to decision or 
helping to cope with uncertainties (Seidenschnur & Krücken, 2019).
In addition, while strategic advisory boards share many of the characteristics linked to 
collegial bodies, the way their members are selected prevents them from making ratio-
nalized university governance more democratic as this would demand that the members 
are elected from the different groups within the university and not handpicked by the 
leadership (Olsen, 2007). At the same time, these bodies can provide more internal 
legitimacy to leadership decisions as the leadership can claim that they consulted with 
highly ranked academics. This might also explain why strategic advisory boards are used 
in less democratic environments as a tool to not only gather the legitimacy and prestige of 
world-renowned experts but also create the allure of democratic decision-making with-
out having real democratic governance arrangements.
Therefore, one could label the form of governance introduced through advisory 
boards as a sort of controlled collegiality – having a number of policy implications. 
While the leadership acts as a gatekeeper controlling access to the board, once members 
are nominated the power relation becomes more equal, especially since the agenda- 
setting is happening in an open way and the university as well as the leadership depend 
on the legitimacy that the board provides. Given that academic prestige is still a key factor 
in nominating members to these boards, the leadership cannot simply push members 
aside, resulting in more classical forms of academic collegial governance interactions. 
A possible implication is that the institutional governance of higher education institu-
tions could become more complex if strategic advisory boards are established.
As such, the metaphor of shadow governance could have two opposite meanings. 
First, strategic advisory boards may be interpreted as older historical governance forms 
infusing the modernized university, although not in a formalized fashion – only in the 
shadow of existing governance arrangements. In this sense, one could argue that strategic 
advisory bodies are examples of a translation between the old and new governance 
models in higher education (Sahlin, 2012), and as a reinvention of older forms of 
`managing the academic culture` (Dill, 2012). Second, in an era where `excellence` 
and `competition` is at the forefront of policy agendas in many countries, strategic 
advisory boards could also be interpreted as an example of how the formalized university 
is increasingly impacting informal governance structures where `elitist` governance 
arrangements are developing in the shadow of formalized stakeholder governance 
arrangements. Interestingly, such `elitist` governance structures were one of the key 
issues paving the way for the representative democracy movement in universities in the 
1960s and 1970s (Chapman, 1983; De Boer & Stensaker, 2007), hinting at how moder-
nization of governance is also historically embedded.
For those in the realm of policy-making, the current study may highlight both 
problems and potentials. The problem relates to the fact that shadow governance 
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arrangements such as strategic advisory boards may develop into arenas of institutional 
resistance and resilience toward external reform attempts imposed at universities (see 
also Teelken, 2015). Institutional strategic advisory boards offer high-level interpreta-
tions of challenges and recommendations that may or may not be in line with current 
national and institutional policies. The potential relates to the fact that such strategic 
advisory boards are challenging to control even by the institutional leadership, making 
them into an opportunity for external influence. The fact that strategic advisory boards 
have a membership consisting not only of reputed academics, but also people having 
managerial and leadership experience from various settings, could offer possibilities for 
cooptation also from the outside (Bleiklie et al., 2015). As such, policy-makers could take 
an active stance toward strategic advisory boards encourage their initiation while also 
suggesting criteria for membership and expertise to be represented. In this way, many 
strategic advisory bodies become instruments for a softer and more legitimate introduc-
tion of external demands and expectations into the core of higher education institutions.
Obviously, this study has limitations making it impossible to provide answers to the 
scenarios suggested above. Still, the scenarios do suggest that strategic advisory boards 
are an interesting phenomenon requiring further studies. While this article offers a first 
conceptualization of the role of advisory boards as well as an initial empirical snapshot of 
the way they operate, follow up research that maps advisory boards and their use by 
university leaderships around the world in a more encompassing fashion, e.g., through 
a larger survey, would be possible avenues to pursue. This would also allow an investiga-
tion into potential interactions between this new instrument for governance and local 
governance arrangements or politico-administrative systems (Bleiklie & Michelsen, 
2013), which might be the root for regional variations.
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